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Comment  Martin Feldstein
I’m pleased to be a discussant of Barry Eichengreen’s chapter about whether 
the euro and the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will 
survive.
Before turning to the substance of this interesting chapter, I should say 
something regarding the views about the euro that I expressed before its 
launch a decade ago (Feldstein 1992, 1997, 2007). Contrary to what many 
people think, I did not express doubts about whether the EMU could be 
launched or whether it could survive. My concern in those papers was that 
the single currency would have undesirable long-  term economic and po-
litical eﬀects, including higher average unemployment in the euro zone and 
a weakening of the political alliance between Europe and the United States. 
I shall not pursue those ideas here.
Barry has given us a careful and balanced analysis of the possibility that 
one or more members of the EMU will leave the monetary union in the com-
ing decade. He concludes that one country leaving in the next ten years is 
unlikely, and a complete breakdown of the EMU during that period is even 
less likely. He notes that it is diﬃcult to predict beyond ten years but suggests 
that a political marriage that lasts ten years is likely to keep going.
I will begin by discussing Barry’s analysis and then go beyond his frame-
work to consider two other reasons why one or more members of the EMU 
might choose to abandon the euro.
The draft that Barry circulated at the conference was dated May 2008, 
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indicating that he prepared these remarks well in advance of the meeting. 
But as he noted in his presentation, the current ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis 
may provide a severe test of the strength of the monetary union. However, 
nothing Barry said in his presentation makes me think that he changed his 
mind because of the current situation. I’ll return to that at the end of my 
remarks.
The potential exit of an EMU member is not just a hypothetical question. 
The interest rate diﬀerentials among the ten-  year government bonds of the 
EMU countries show that ﬁ  nancial markets consider it a real possibility. The 
interest rate on the German bond is the lowest. But the ten- year government 
bonds of Greece and Portugal pay over 100 basis points more than German 
bonds, and even Italian bonds pay nearly 100 basis points more—indicating 
that the markets think there is a risk that during the next decade, those coun-
tries will not be able to pay in euros—either because they are insolvent, or 
because they have left the EMU.
Barry’s analysis proceeds along two basic tracks. First, he considers 
whether it could be in a country’s rational self-  interest to leave the EMU. 
Second, he considers the barriers—technical, legal, and political—that 
might cause it to stay in the EMU, even if the government of that country 
thought it would be desirable to leave.
I will start with the latter issues. Barry notes that many previous currency 
unions or single currency states have broken up (the Austro-  Hungarian 
empire, the Soviet Union, the Czech-  Slovak split). But he then goes on to 
argue that those splits occurred either at a much earlier time in history, when 
ﬁ  nancial systems were simpler, or in countries with simpler ﬁ  nancial systems. 
He also notes that the exit by one EMU country might not be by mutual 
agreement, adding treaty complications. But in the end, he concludes that 
splitting a country out of the EMU would be possible, although the leaver 
would have a diminished political status in the European Union.
Having set those issues aside, I can focus on why a country might decide 
to leave the EMU. Of course, countries don’t decide. Political leaders decide. 
I will come back to that important distinction.
Rational Optimal Policy
I will start as Barry does by asking whether it could be in a country’s inter-
est to leave the EMU. Barry focuses on the desire of a country to pursue a 
diﬀerent monetary policy. He notes that a country with slow growth, high 
unemployment, and a large trade deﬁ  cit—he gives Greece, Italy, and/  or 
Portugal as current examples—might be tempted to leave in order to ease 
monetary conditions and to devalue its currency. Barry explains why that 
might be a foolish decision, because leaving the euro zone might lead to 
higher real interest rates and higher inﬂ  ation.
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be Germany, if some future majority in the European Central Bank (ECB) 
is less concerned about inﬂ  ation than Germany is at that time—could leave 
the EMU in order to pursue a tighter policy. Barry explains the risks of 
that strategy—particularly, the capital inﬂ  ow that might occur—but recog-
nizes that the economic consequences for a strong country leaving the EMU 
would be less adverse than for a weak-  currency country.
Although the problem of a one- size- ﬁ  ts- all monetary policy is the most ob-
vious reason for a country to want to leave the EMU, it is not the only one.
The Stability and Growth Pact that limits ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits could be another 
reason why a country might want to leave the EMU. In a serious down-
turn, a country may wish to pursue a traditional Keynesian policy of ﬁ  scal 
stimulus. Although the Stability and Growth Pact may be elastic enough to 
permit some of that stimulus, a country may feel constrained from acting as 
aggressively as it wants. It is certainly possible that the current downturn—
especially if it becomes very deep and very long—will provide a ﬁ  scal chal-
lenge to EMU solidarity that has not occurred during the past decade.
It is of course also possible that a substantial number of countries will 
decide at some future tome to pursue a very expansionary ﬁ  scal policy and 
that the Economic and Financial Aﬀairs Council (ECOFIN) will choose to 
allow that because of a signiﬁ  cant economic downturn. A country that is 
opposed to such large ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits and that sees itself hurt by the result-
ing rise in euro interest rates and by the induced change in the value of the 
euro might feel that it would rather pursue a tighter ﬁ  scal policy in order to 
avoid those exchange rate and interest rate consequences and would leave 
the EMU in order to do so.
The current ﬁ  nancial crisis raises another problem—the lack of a clear 
national lender of last resort. It remains to be seen how willing the ECB will 
be to provide national central banks with the volume of euros needed to be 
a full lender of last resort. If a country sees its banks failing because the 
national bank cannot create as much currency as it would have been able to 
before the EMU, that would be a further reason for a country to consider 
leaving the EMU.
There is one additional reason that might apply to leaving the European 
Union as well as the EMU. As of now, taxation is a national responsibility 
within the European Union. Income redistribution among the EU countries 
is thus relatively limited. But there is frequent discussion in some circles 
that this should be a matter for the European Union, opening the way to 
substantial income redistribution. High-  income countries might ﬁ  nd this 
reason enough to want out.
Although each of these four reasons—monetary, ﬁ  scal, lender of last 
resort, and taxation—might be enough to cause a country to want to leave 
the EMU, Barry might of course be able to explain in each case that doing 
so would be a mistake. But the economic oﬃcials in the EMU countries 
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a quite diﬀerent view of what drives inﬂ  ation, exchange rates, and other key 
variables. We certainly know that thinking about those key relations has 
changed substantially, even in the United States, during the past few decades. 
So, oﬃcials might be provoked by any of these four reasons to believe that 
withdrawing from the EMU would be helpful, even if the majority of econo-
mists at the conference would disagree.
Threats
But for a moment, let’s assume that the government oﬃcials fully under-
stand the adverse consequences of leaving the EMU and do not want to do 
so. These oﬃcials may nevertheless not like the way policy is going in the 
EMU—monetary policy at the ECB or ﬁ  scal policy because of an inad-
equately (or excessively) permissive ECOFIN. That may cause the country 
to threaten that it will leave the EMU if policy is not changed. That is clearly 
a substantial risk if the country is Germany or France. But even if it is one 
of the smaller countries, it might be a serious threat, because it could be seen 
as the beginning of an unraveling of the EMU. So, either type of country 
could make the threat in hopes that the threat would be enough to cause their 
EMU colleagues to agree to their desired change in policy.
The risk of course is that the other countries may not be intimidated. 
The threatening country would then have to choose between accepting a 
humiliating defeat or leaving the EMU.
Decisions of Politicians
Finally, I want to return to the idea that policy decisions are made by indi-
vidual politicians or groups of politicians who are motivated by their own 
self- interest rather than by a pure interest in the national well- being. Demo-
cratic procedures are of course supposed to align the self-  interest of politi-
cians and the well-  being of at least a majority of the public. But that only 
works in a complex area such as economic policy if the public is suﬃciently 
wise, technically sophisticated, and farsighted.
If not, and this is certainly a more reasonable description, a politician 
could make the case for a policy that would help him or her or his or her 
party to get elected, even if it is not in the long-  run national interest.
Here’s an example of how self-  interested politicians could lead to an 
EMU withdrawal by building on existing voter attitudes. A recent oﬃcial 
Eurobarometer survey indicated that 95 percent of respondents in the twelve 
euro countries believe that the EMU has raised prices (Lane 2006). In Italy, it 
was 97 percent, and in Germany, 91 percent. If at some future time inﬂ  ation 
is rising rapidly, it might occur to some political group to argue that if they 
are elected, they will bring down prices or inﬂ  ation by taking the country in 
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Or, to take a diﬀerent example, what if the current economic downturn 
and ﬁ  nancial crisis becomes very severe, producing very high unemploy-
ment? It is certainly possible that some politicians will argue out of a mixture 
of conviction and self-  interest that if elected to a position of control, they 
would take their country out of the EMU, permitting the combination of 
easy money, ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits, and lender-  of-  last resort assistance to banks to 
revive the economy.
It is important in this context that the support for the EMU, and even 
for the European Union, is generally very weak. For example, when the 
Eurobarometer recently asked French respondents how attached they are 
to the European Union, only 16 percent said that they are “very attached.” 
In contrast, 56 percent of that group said they are very attached to France 
as a nation.
Barry’s chapter reports a similar lack of support for the EMU among 
respondents in many countries. When asked in the 2006 Eurobarometer 
survey whether they thought EMU membership had been to the advantage 
of their country, only 40 percent of Italians said yes. The proportion was 
similar in Portugal and even smaller in the Netherlands and Greece. In Ger-
many, it was only about 45 percent. Only four countries showed really sub-
stantial belief—more than 60 percent—that EMU membership had been 
advantageous: Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria, and Finland.
Similarly, when asked whether they had conﬁ  dence in the ECB, only 44 
percent of Italians said yes.
In short, after a decade of experience with membership in the EMU, the 
public support for EMU is weak at best. A political leader or political party 
could use this weak support to promote its political power by promising to 
withdraw the country from the EMU or by saying that they will threaten 
to withdraw if the other member countries do not agree to their proposed 
policy changes.
The currently developing economic crisis may provide a signiﬁ  cant test 
of these temptations.
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